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Shareholder interest is unprotected until and unless precise financial decision
making is in place. Although literature supports the independent directors'
monitoring function in a decision-making process, for a controversial debt
financing issue, the influence of the largest shareholders may hinder such an
action. This study aims to delineate the association between board indepen-
dence and debt financing when the largest shareholders are likely to play a sig-
nificant role between them. With a sample of Vietnamese listed companies
from 2007 to 2016, our regression analyses show that a nonlinear U-shaped
relationship between level of board independence and debt financing is stron-
ger among the largest shareholders with a high level of shareholdings in their
shareholding group than the full sample. This finding implies the determining
influence of the largest shareholders with a high level of shareholdings in a
company. However, this association is not found in companies with a low level
of shareholdings by the largest shareholders. Results reveal that the largest
shareholders have the incentive to influence the decision making of indepen-
dent directors about debt financing when their shareholdings are high. Specifi-
cally, issuing more debt to raise capital for business reduces the risk of the
largest shareholders losing their controlling rights. The results are further
supported by several robustness checks and controlling for economic events
such as the global financial crisis and ASEAN Economic Community.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Conflicts between owners and managers, known as
Type I agency problem, arise when the interests of foun-
ders and managers are not aligned (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). Type II agency problem occurs when a
conflict exists between majority and minority shareholders
(Cheng, 2014). Shareholders face a clear trade-off: issue
more shares to finance the company's investment by fac-
ing the risk of losing (or diluting) their control or retain
their control but have insufficient internal fund
(Ampenberger, Bennedsen, & Zhou, 2012). However, not
all shareholders attach the same importance to control
motives. Obviously, large shareholders with high control
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